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comprises about seventy pages, McHugh
presents four chapters that delve into
the mechanics and details of how games
were organized and conducted. The concluding chapter introduces the reader to
the computer system that revolutionized
naval gaming in the late 1950s (since
replaced by successive generations of
more sophisticated machinery). Four
appendixes provide greater detail on
determining chance and probability, as
well as a glossary of war-gaming terms.
However, no index is included. Not necessarily geared toward a general reading
audience, Fundamentals of War Gaming
delivers a technically oriented wargaming operator an essential handbook
on the history and importance of the
craft. It is a user’s guide, and some of the
techniques and methodologies for planning, executing, adjudicating, and analyzing war games are still in use today.
This is a reprint of the third edition of
McHugh’s book, which was originally
published in 1966. If there is an heir to
Frank McHugh—a nationally recognized gaming expert with the expertise
that once set McHugh apart from his
peers—perhaps he or she would consider updating the text by bringing the
reader into the twenty-first century. This
is a potential avenue for further inquiry,
one that would be of great interest to
those looking to what the future holds
for the profession of gaming, or to the
relationship in the twenty-first century
between war games and curriculum at
service schools. This additional insight
would provide enough material for a
useful fourth edition. However, as it
stands, McHugh’s book chronicles the
history of gaming and describes the
various techniques, procedures, and
parameters employed by war gamers
throughout the first half of the twentieth
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century. It is an interesting and useful
book, one that I highly recommend.
Jeff Shaw

Naval War College

Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor.
The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for
Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. New
York: Pantheon, 2012. 800pp. $35

At the end of Cobra II: The Inside Story
of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq
(2007), Michael Gordon and Bernard
Trainor concluded that Americans and
Iraqis had created an Iraq of “chaos,
suffering, and a future that is still
vexed.” Six years later that vexed future
is realized in their latest book, The
Endgame. Thoroughly researched, this
book leverages not only documentary
sources but interviews with American and Iraqi leaders who shaped the
post-Saddam Iraq to give the most
encompassing narrative to date of the
U.S. occupation of Iraq. Nearly eight
hundred pages in length, this is the best
single-volume study of the American
and Iraqi experiences in postinvasion
Iraq from 2003 to the U.S. withdrawal
in 2011. Any future histories of the
Iraqi war will have to acknowledge this
comprehensive research and account.
After retracing some territory familiar
from Cobra II, Gordon and Trainor pre
sent a detailed account of the American
occupation and effort to create a new
Iraq. What becomes clear in this volume
is that President George W. Bush, his
administration, and the first team of
military leaders failed to create an adequate policy and strategy to transform
the fractious Iraqi people into a stable
nation. Sectarian violence, internal
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and external terrorism, and American
myopia created a stew of insurgency,
instability, and fear in Iraq while the
United States focused on “transitioning”
the nation to a new sovereign government. In many respects Endgame is
the tragic story of ill-conceived policy
and strategy followed by a succession
of ill-fated and politically charged efforts to get out of the quagmire that
Iraq had become after April 2003.
Gordon and Trainor divide their narrative into three parts. First they explore
the descent into sectarian violence and
the inability of the United States to shift
the nation to Iraqi control between 2003
and 2006. Readers will recognize the
all-too-familiar shortcomings of Donald
Rumsfeld, Tommy Franks, Paul Bremer,
and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez
in their attempt to end the occupation
as quickly as possible. The second part is
the core of the story, detailing the genesis
of the “surge,” the “Awakening” movement, and the effects of David Petraeus’s
counterinsurgency approach on an Iraq
that was effectively transforming its
religious demographics through violence
and intimidation. In the third section,
the authors describe the fait accompli
of the American withdrawal under
President Barack Obama, leaving an
unsettled Iraq under a suspect coalition
government led by Nuri Kamal al-Maliki
and “a dysfunctional political system.”
While some may take issue with the
authors’ liberal use of what they label
simply “classified sources” and “authors’
notes” in their citations, for those of us
who served in Iraq the prose is hauntingly accurate. As a veteran of the Iraq
War, I find that my personal recollections of events do not differ from this
book’s narrative, especially the account
of the changeover from General George
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Casey to General David Petraeus in the
winter of 2006–2007. As Casey (and
General John Abizaid) sought to end
the war for the coalition by accelerating
the transition of control to Iraqi security
forces (ready or not), troops on the
ground recognized that the strategy was
a rush to failure. Gordon and Trainor
deftly juxtapose Casey’s increasingly
irrelevant assessments to Bush with
the daily “SIGACTS,” reports of the
increased military and civilian casualties from vehicle-borne improvisedexplosive-device attacks across Iraq.
Petraeus certainly comes out better here than do the other American
leaders, but he is not spared scrutiny
entirely. The authors are careful to
note that Petraeus was opportunistic
in embracing the Anbar Awakening
movement and that he was lucky to
have Ryan Crocker and General Ray
Odierno on board with his counterinsurgency approach in 2007 and 2008.
The real value of this book lies in the
effort that Gordon and Trainor make to
explain the dynamics of Iraqi politics
and sectarian fractures. To be sure, they
argue that Iraq is not now the democracy desired by the United States but
remains a nation of “sectarian tensions
and potential flashpoints.” Perhaps
Endgame is the best attempt to understand the complex relationship of Maliki
with other Shiite groups, the Iranians,
the Sunnis, and the Kurds as they all
competed in those years to stake out
their interests in a post-Saddam Iraq.
In this sense, this volume is the most
complete of the three that Trainor and
Gordon have written and should be
read by anyone seeking to understand
the ordeal of the United States in Iraq.
Jon Scott Logel

Naval War College
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